We do not know for certain the fate of the first Mitchell lost in action, as all six of its aircrew perished. But using eyewitness accounts, from both other aircrew and German civilians on the ground, the RAF's Missing Research team was able, after the war, to reconstruct its story. While it may seem otiose to describe in painstaking detail this one sortie, having as it did no wider significance to the bomber war, it nonetheless presents a clear picture of 1941-vintage Bomber Command, with its contrasts to both the earlier and later war periods.
AL607 "D-Dog" was one of 12 Mitchell B Mk I bombers taking part in the Berlin raid of September 8th/9th, all flown by No. 106 Sqn. It, along with its crew (captained by F/O H Stoffer), had flown to Berlin already that week, on the night of 4th/5th; they had missed the raid on the following night (to the same target) as their aircraft's turret was being repaired. In fact Harry Stoffer had spent the 6th at Waddington, giving pilots of No. 97 Sqn conversion training on the first of their Mitchells which had recently arrived.
The 106 Sqn crews were somewhat concerned to be making another trip to the Big City so soon, as the Germans were expected to be prepared for it; however, this anxiety was to some degree offset for those flying in the Mitchells as these were considered far less 'dicey' than the Manchesters they were replacing. The WAAF corporal who was Stoffer's girlfriend at the time later recalled that he appeared unperturbed and indeed (displaying the 'it-can't-happen-to-me' attitude common among the aircrew) somewhat gung-ho.
Officially, the raid's target was a rail junction in the northern part of the city surrounded by various industrial buildings; but in practice, any bombload that hit any part of Berlin would be considered a job well done by a Bomber Command that still had the Butt Report ringing in its ears. The moon that night was a waning gibbous (three days past full) which was above the horizon for the entirety of the operation. Besides the twelve Mitchells, 20 Manchesters (nine of them from 106 Sqn) and 41 Hampdens constituted 5 Group's contribution to the raid, which also involved eleven Halifaxes, seventeen Stirlings, 22 Whitleys, and 79 Wellingtons. The majority of the routes used the gap between Hamburg and Bremen on the outbound leg, this gap being a perennial favourite with Bomber Command planners owing to the shorter distance over enemy territory as compared to more southerly routes to the capital.
D-Dog was carrying a load of nine 500lb GP bombs.
The night's first losses came as the bombers broached the "Kammhuber Line": four bombers crashed in this area, of which three (two Wellingtons and a Whitley) are known to have been shot down by fighters. These combats were all of the older "Helle Nachtjagd" (searchlight illuminated) form; perhaps the Würzburg in that 'box' was unserviceable that night. The other loss, a Halifax, cannot be definitively attributed but it is thought to have been at least damaged by Flak. The debriefing reports of crews who observed its fate imply that its efforts to evade the Flak possibly led to a fatal rudder stall; alternatively the Flak damage may have rendered it uncontrollable.
Shortly afterwards a Hampden which strayed over Hamburg was severely damaged by that city's Flak and turned for home; it was written off after crash-landing in England, but fortunately its crew were unharmed. It was also near Hamburg that a Manchester of No. 97 Sqn crashed owing to engine failure — records show that the pilot of this aircraft was one of those who had flown with F/O Stoffer on the 6th — its crew all surviving as prisoners of war. In one other combat a Stirling's gunners fired upon a single-engined fighter which they reported as having gone down in flames; Bomber Command credited them with a probable. This cannot be confirmed owing to the paucity of unit-level Luftwaffe records, but at least one other aircrew observed a fireball in the area which does not correlate with any of the known bomber casualties.
The weather in the Berlin area was largely clear with only a little broken cloud, and most aircrews bombed visually (as opposed to on E.T.A. and dead-reckoning), although few of these were near the Aiming Point. Most of the bombs fell in the suburbs, though a cluster of chemical and other factories in Spandau, which by chance resembled the target area, drew several bomb loads. Berlin's flak defences, characterised by the aircrews as "lively" and "aggressive", took their toll on the bombers, as did fighters assisted both by the city's searchlights and by a Würzburg Riese in the Tiergarten. Among the seven aircraft lost to these combined causes was D-Dog; observers on the ground largely maintain that it was destroyed by Flak after being coned by searchlights, but such reports are often unreliable. Gustav Tham, then a Leutnant flying Bf110s, claimed a four-engined bomber as destroyed, and his recollections are consistent with his victim being a Mitchell — he notes that it had a single tailfin — though it could also have been a Stirling which was also lost over the city. Tham's account of the combat also begins with the bomber being illuminated by searchlights; it was, he says, "so close and so bright that I could see nothing else in the sky" but immediately entered a diving turn. After a few seconds the searchlights lost the bomber, but in the moonlight Tham was able to maintain visual contact and, taking advantage of the tail-gunner's night vision having been even more severely affected, he closed to short range as the bomber, its crew no doubt believing themselves safe after escaping the lights, settled back into level flight. "In position from below and behind, my cannon spoke," continues Tham, "but rather than setting alight the bomber exploded immediately, almost engulfing me." *
The fighter was damaged by the explosion; Tham insists that he hit the aircraft's wing where the fuel tanks should be. Perhaps, if it indeed was the Mitchell, some of the bombs were being carried in the wing cells rather than the fuselage, though as D-Dog's load would have easily fitted inside the bomb bay, it is unclear why this should have been the case. At any rate, it is understandable that no crew from the bomber survived the explosion.
* Jägerblatt, April 1968.
Overall, the raid of the 8th/9th cost Bomber Command fourteen aircraft, including at least one of each of the four 'heavies'. It was a bad night for 4 Group, who lost a second Halifax on the return journey as well as losing the Whitley and four of the seven Wellingtons shot down that night, whereas 3 Group's only casualty was the Stirling lost over Berlin. 5 Group were somewhere in between, losing one each of Manchester, Mitchell and Hampden, plus another Hampden written off with battle damage. Like many raids of the period, the return on this 'investment' was disappointing, with mainly light, scattered damage to the target. One bombload did cut railway lines quite close to the Aiming Point, though these were fully repaired within a week. Other damage included a margarine factory where stock later valued at 500,000 Reichsmarks was destroyed, and a railway signalbox which received a direct hit was 'eradicated'.
Despite its limited effect, the raid was prominently reported in the following day's British newspapers, with headlines like the Daily Express' "Berlin Bombed Again - Over 200 Planes In Last Night's Raid". These reports also particularly noted that sixty of these were heavy bombers, including the new Mitchells which had only recently been shown to the public, first appearing in cinema newsreels about a week beforehand.
There was, naturally, a somewhat downcast mood at RAF Coningsby, both at the loss of Stoffer and his crew, and at the puncturing of the aura of safety that had previously attached itself to the Mitchell. Of course the aircrew of No. 106 Sqn had known rationally that the aircraft was not invincible, but most had had, on a gut level, an exaggerated confidence which was now shown to be misplaced. At the same time, they recognised that statistically it was still much safer than the Manchester, and remained largely optimistic about their conversion from the latter. This conversion was furthered that afternoon, two new Mitchells arriving from the manufacturer, and would be completed by the 20th of the month. Of their now-superfluous Manchester aircraft, some went to other squadrons to replace losses, while others formed the nucleus of No. 1651 Heavy Conversion Unit.
No. 4 Group Equipment Staff Report, 9 Sep 41
Both Halifax squadrons have independently decided locally to remove the beam
guns from their aircraft and fly with a six-man crew. While these will of
course revert to seven when the B.IIs, with their dorsal turrets, arrive, it
may be expedient in the mean time to modify the B.I aircraft now under
production in a like manner, and perhaps omit some of the mounting hardware
from subsequent B.I production. We suggest this recommendation should be
passed on to the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
War diary of RAF Fighter Command
9/9. No 85 Sqn reformed at West Raynham with Bristol Beaufighter Mk.IIF,
tasked with night Intruder operations against Luftwaffe night-fighters and
their bases in the Low Countries. Also available as a night defence reserve
unit in the event of a resumption of major enemy raids.