"Yes, I've seen it. As bad as we expected, maybe even worse." Sir Richard Pierse, the C-in-C, was on the 'phone with Portal. "It looks like we're in for the fight of our lives."
The source of Pierse's disquiet was a document that had just been circulated to Bomber Command and the War Cabinet. David Bensusan-Butt's report, based on bombing photographs from June and July, reached several damning conclusions on the Command's navigational capabilities. The summary statistic, that only a third of those crews claiming to have found and attacked their targets had actually gotten within five miles, was sure to give new ammunition to those who felt the resources being devoted to the bomber offensive should be diverted elsewhere.
"I've had a pow-wow with my staff," Pierse continued, "and identified a few angles we can take. First is this business of haze. In clear conditions the numbers look rather good–"
"Only just over half, wasn't it?" interrupted Portal, "That still doesn't sound very good."
"I know, but it actually is rather impressive for men under fire. I'm sure statistics could be found that would make the Army and Navy look just as bad. But as I was saying, ground haze thoroughly ruins our performance, which is awkward since the Ruhr Valley's almost never clear. And when that combines with a new moon, it appears to be sheer luck if anyone finds the target at all."
"And how are you planning to turn this into good news?" asked Portal.
"Well, there are a few ideas going around about how to deal with haze. Of course you know about the FIDO experiments, well, someone suggested that incendiary bombs could have the same effect. So once a target's burning it should drive off the haze," said Pierse.
"That still requires the first few bombers to find it though."
"Yes," admitted Pierse, "but it suggests we should do better on larger raids. Another idea that came up was flares. At the moment we don't use them much, occasionally an crew drop one when they're well and truly lost; we could try having each bomber drop a flare at the start of its bombing run, the lighting would build up over the course of a raid."
"What about having a few aircraft full of flares that go in first and blanket the area?" suggested Portal.
"Oh, that's Bufton's idea, isn't it? Bit dependent on the flare force lighting up the right place, I'd feel like I was spinning a roulette wheel every time I launched a raid."
When the discussion ended some fifteen minutes later, the problems remained unsolved.
The six Group commanders had been summoned for a conference to hash out Bomber Command's answers to the Butt Report. Oxland, who had written the ORs for the heavies back in '36, ironically had only Wellingtons in 1 Group. 3 and 4 Groups, under Baldwin and Carr, were slowly replacing theirs with heavies, 4 Group also still having a few Whitleys. 5 Group, as we have seen, were busy 'jumping ship' from Manchester to Mitchell as a replacement for their Hampdens. Stevenson's 2 Group, the light bombers, were not really relevant to the strategic offensive. Lastly, Foster's 6 Group were responsible for the OTUs.
"You all know the problem," began Pierse, "and you and your staffs have had four days to hatch plans. So what have you got to offer me?"
Stevenson opened the batting by claiming that the heavy bomber crews weren't actually pressing home their attacks, owing to insufficient courage. The other AOCs, used to this argument from Stevenson, promptly ignored him.
"One thing we must do is get enough cameras to put one in every bomber," argued Carr. "Otherwise we're stuck trusting statisticians and their guesswork."
This suggestion, however, met with disapproval from Oxland. "Every pound the camera weighs is a pound less for bombs. Your Halifaxes may hardly notice the difference, but it really cuts into a Wimpey's payload. Besides, the aircrews don't like carrying the cameras."
"And before you regale us with your explanation for that dislike, Stevenson," interjected Pierse, "it's because the cameras can't be used in a low-level or diving attack."
"Here's a thought. The photo plots give us a crude ranking of the Squadrons, don't they? I mean as to which get the best accuracy," said Slessor. "If we make those results known, and give it a competitive aspect, crews will be eager for their turn with the camera, to prove they're the best."
After this idea was discussed, and plans for the "Command photographic ladder" roughed out, Baldwin raised the question of flares.
"I've been thinking about the ideas you sent us for ways to light up the targets," he said, "and I see two problems. First, raids will need to be much more concentrated in time, and second, the flare-light will make our bombers more visible over the target, which is just too risky. Especially if they're having to make straight and level bombing runs for the photo's sake."
"But surely that depends on altitude," Carr noted, "if we went in at operational ceiling instead of 8,000 feet, then flares on the ground or hanging under a parachute at a couple of thousand wouldn't cause a problem."
"True, but then the target's harder to spot again because you're higher," Oxland pointed out.
"To change the subject," said Foster, not wanting to listen to Carr and Oxland rehash the 'altitude argument' yet again, "what about radionavigation?"
"I don't think there's anything we can do about that," answered Pierse, "we just have to wait patiently until the boffins have something ready for us to try."
"Though perhaps we should tell TRE we're actually interested now," Baldwin added, "they almost gave up trying to sell us the idea."
Following a little further discussion, Pierse summed up: "We have several ideas, which should be put to experiment as soon as practicable. In the meantime, let's hope the Powers that Be don't lose faith in the bomber offensive."
"Hear, hear," chorused the AOCs.
"But I wonder if we're coming at it from the wrong end, so to speak," said Portal. The Chief of the Air Staff was meeting with Professor Lindemann, the PM's scientific adviser. "Judging by these figures, Bomber Command can't destroy anything smaller than a town. But if it were to destroy the entire town, it wouldn't really matter whether the individual factories were hit or not."
"Ah, but can your bombers destroy an entire town?" asked Lindemann.
"That," replied Portal, with a quiet smile, "is what I want you to find out. That's the sort of question your S-Branch was built to answer, right?"
"So what you're saying is, that when Trenchard laid out his philosophy for winning a war by bombing alone… he wasn't thinking big enough?"
Memorandum from Vickers-Supermarine to the MAP, 31/08/1941
The Hercules II* engines with NACA cowlings, as delivered from Bristols on
the 18th inst., have been fitted to the 317A (B.IA) prototype AT308, whose
first flight is expected in about a fortnight. As the airframe is otherwise
a standard B.I off the production line, it is anticipated that switching
the line over to the new variant can be achieved rapidly and with minimal
disruption as soon as the prototype passes its acceptance tests.
A preliminary programme has also been devised for modification of the B.Is
already in service to B.IA standard by on-site working parties of Vickers
and Bristol fitters, as detailed in the enclosed schedule documents.
Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State for Air (excerpt)
… and he told me that the Russians have been bombing Berlin for the last
few weeks. I got the impression that we might gain diplomatic points with
them if we launched our own series of raids on the capital; I believe we
haven't been there since the 13th? Of course I'm well aware that Ministers
can only get the RAF to do what it already wanted to do anyway, but you
might bring it up with Portal. The Russians are feeling pretty embattled at
the moment as Leningrad's just been encircled…